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IN RE MARRIAGE OF GRAHAM

EDUCATION ACQUIRED DURING MARRIAGEFOR RICHER OR POORER?
Upon dissolution of marriage, couples often call upon the
courts to clearly define their rights and equitably divide their
interests in property acquired through collaborative efforts.
Property division is impeded by the clash between classifying
the result of the couple's effort as "marital property"' and perceiving their relationship as a 'partnership" or "shared enterprise."' 2 Additionally, courts have failed to develop specific
guidelines for dividing the property acquired during marriage.
Rather they have resorted to a case-by-case approach.3 As such,
partners to a dissolving marriage may find little certainty in pursuing a just division of their acquisitions.
The 'partnership-enterprise" approach to marriage is a response to rapidly changing social attitudes toward women's
roles. Because the traditional common law failed to recognize
their separate property interests, increasing numbers of working women demanded independent legal recognition of their
personal gains.4 Married Women's Property Acts were devel1. Marital property is to be distinguished from property concepts in
general. See generally H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 14.8, at 450
(1968) [hereinafter cited as CLARK]. Although different systems are statutorily employed to divide property acquired during marriage upon divorce,
"the bare legal title to property acquired or accumulated by the spouses
during marriage often does not correspond to their real rights in such property." See text accompanying notes 60-66 infra (describing traditional concepts of property and statutory guidelines enacted to enable narrow
categorization of various properties as "marital property").
2. E.g., Krauskopf, A Theory for "Just"Division of Marital Property in
Missouri, 41 Mo. L. REV. 165, 166 n.14 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Krauskopf]. "Marriage is a partnership to which each spouse makes [an] equally
important contribution." The term "partnership" is here restricted in reference to economic aspects of marriage and not the legal entity of partnership.
3. Statutes modeled upon the UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT,
UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 459 (Supp. 1977) supply only general guidelines

for determining whether an item constitutes marital property. See note 66
infra. Property division is typically dependent upon factual circumstances
of each case. Granato v. Granato, 130 Colo. 283, 497 P.2d 1006 (1954).
4. For a detailed discussion of this historical development, see Foster,
Freed, MaritalPropertyReform in New York- Partnershipof Co-Equals?,8
FAM. L.Q. 169, 171-78 (1974). See also Hill, Stogel, Family Law, 1976 ANN.
SUmv. OF Am.LAw 359:
Under . ; . traditional rules, courts relied on assumptions about marriage and property which are no longer valid today: . . . alimony was

considered a discharge of the husband's duty to support his wife indefi-
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oped to assure protection of these interests, 5 but fell short of fulfilling the homemaker-housewife's position. The nature of her
role made enhancement of her property interests socially unlikely. Recently, courts have sought to rectify this situation by
recognizing the marital relationship as comprised of two contributing members, thus giving each an interest in marital acquisitions. 6 Judicial use of this construct has since expanded
considerably and is now widely applied to contributions by
homemakers or wage-earners.7 Benefit to the "partnership" has
become a keynote in protecting each spouse's "investment."
Although the partnership-enterprise theory ideally seeks a
fair adjudication of partners' fractional shares at dissolution, its
application is not without obstacles. A primary impediment is
that property acquired during the marriage must additionally,
by statute, be capable of division. 8 The presence of intangible
qualities inherent in some properties 9 further complicates this
nitely, and jointly owned marital property was presumed to be held by
the husband. With the increasing importance of equal rights concepts,
especially in the context of women's rights, reform of this antiquated
system was inevitable.... ;
Note, The Economics of Divorce:Alimony and PropertyAwards, 43 U. CIn.
L. REV. 133, 146 (1974).
5. See generally Rheinstein, Division of Marital Property, 12 WI-AMETTE L.J. 413 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Rheinstein]: "The Married Women's Property Acts ... gave married women unrestricted disposition and
title to their own earnings and whatever property they might own through
inheritance or other events." Id. at 414; CLARK, supra note 1, § 7.2, at 222-29.
6. Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 229, 320 A.2d 496, 501 (1974) quoted
in Krauskopf, supra note 2, at 172-73:
[T]he division of property upon divorce is responsive to the concept
that marriage is a shared enterprise, a joint undertaking, that in many
ways it is akin to a partnership. Only if it is clearly understood that far
more than economic factors are involved, will the resulting distribution
be equitable ....
See, e.g., Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. App. 1979) wherein the court
indicated its concern for protection of the "investment" nature of a spouse's
contributions; Vier v. Vier, 62 Wis. 2d 378, 382, 173 N.W.2d 432, 434 (1974);
Lacey v. Lacey, 45 Wis. 2d 378, 382, 173 N.W.2d 142, 144 (1970). See also Foster, Freed, Divorce Reform: Brakes on Breakdown?, 13 J. FAM. L. 443, 476
(1974): "[M]odern marriage should be viewed as a partnership ... and that
upon breakdown of the partnership, alimony and division of property
should be utilized to effect economic justice between them." See note 52
infra.
7. Foster, Preface to I.BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY xiii (1973): "[A]t
least when the family is a functioning unit the wife's contributions should
be regarded as equal to those of the husband, whether they consist exclusively of services in the home or also involve supplementing the family income."
8. E.g., COLO.REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(1) (1973): "[Tlhe court shall...
divide the marital property . . .in such proportions as [it] deems just
9. See text accompanying notes 93-119 infra (discussing the intangible
elements of personal skill and ability).

19791

Education Acquired During Marriage

division. Where the property, or benefit derived therefrom, inures to one spouse though acquired by the collective efforts of
both, 10 courts are strained to satisfy "partnership" interests.
The need for greater clarification of the processes invoked to
resolve property division conflicts has recently arisen in several
jurisdictions." In re Marriage of Graham12 brought the scrutiny of the Colorado Supreme Court to bear upon a most novel
question: Is an educational degree obtained by one spouse during the marriage subject to division as marital property, where
the other spouse has borne the burden of supporting the couple
during that time? 13 If answered affirmatively, problems of prospective valuation ensue due to peculiar characteristics of the
education itself.14 In formulating a property division which is
responsive to the exigencies of each spouse's situation, the court
will face the dilemma of resolving the conflict between the rights
of the contributing partner's interests on the one hand, and the
"personal" nature of the singularly-possessed degree on the
other.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1974, the petitioner, Anne Graham, and the co-petitioner,
Dennis Graham, filed jointly for dissolution of their irretrievably
broken marriage.' 5 They had been married for approximately
five years. Both were young, in good health, and without children. The Grahams jointly managed the apartment house
where they lived, the wife performing a majority of the household tasks. She was also employed as a full-time airline stewardess throughout the marriage, and contributed her earnings to
her husband's education as well as to their primary means of
10. See note 52 infra.
11. E.g., Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. App. 1979) (license to
practice dentistry as marital property); In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d
75 (Colo. 1978) (education as marital property subject to division); In re
Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978) (potential future earning capacity as a distributable asset); Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 264
N.W.2d 97 (1978) (compensatory relief for contributions to spouse's educa-

tion).
12. 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978).
13. Id.
14. For extensive analyses of such difficulties in valuing an educational
achievement, see Castleberry, ConstitutionalLimitations on the Division of
Property Upon Divorce, 10 ST. MARY'S LJ. 37 (1978); Comment, The Interest
of the Community in a Professional Education, 10

(1974).

CALF. W.L. REV. 590

15. "Irretrievably broken" is legislative terminology given to dissolution
of marriage without regard to fault of either party. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10110 (1973); see also IOWA CODE § 598.17 (1970); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.320 (1973
Supp.).
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support. While employed on a part-time basis, Mr. Graham devoted considerable time to acquiring a master's degree in business administration. At the time of the divorce, he had become
employed as an executive assistant with a starting salary of
$14,000.00 per year. No assets had been accumulated during
their marriage. 16
At trial, the parties stipulated that the issues were the value
of the education, whether such an education was a marital asset,
17
and whether such an asset was subject to division by the court.
The trial court found the education to be property to which the
wife acquired a right through her contributions. The trial judge
relied on the earlier case of Greer v. Gree.' s There, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that, upon dissolution, the wife was
entitled to alimony for the like period of years that she had contributed to the family upkeep. 19 The court interpreted the term
"alimony" in light of the then-existing statute 20 which supplied
no definition. Although referred to as such, the award was
not intended for the support of the wife ....
[Ilt resulted from a
consideration of the wife's contribution to the parties' assets and
constitutes an adjustment of property rights ....

It must be con-

sidered as a substitute for, or in lieu of, the wife's rights in the husband's property as distinguished from her rights
21 of future support
envisioned by the ordinary award of alimony.
The underlying factual circumstances in Greer hinted at some
need for alimony per se, and the "adjusted property right" may
have compensated for weight given to those unmentioned nuances.2 2 Though the opinion impliedly pointed to the influence
16. 574 P.2d at 76.
17. Brief for Petitioner-Appellee at 2, Brief for Co-Petitioner-Appellant
at (iii), In re Marriage of Graham, 555 P.2d 527 (Colo. App. 1976).
18. 32 Colo. App. 196, 510 P.2d 905 (1973).
19. 32 Colo. App. 196, 510 P.2d 905 (1973); accord, Diment v. Diment, 531
P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1974) (alimony awarded in lieu of property).
20. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-1-5 (1963).
21. 32 Colo. App. at 199, 510 P.2d at 907.
22. Id. Although the Greertrial court awarded alimony, division of property and child support, the appellate court focused upon the lower court's
adhesion to facts similar to Graham. Of weighty concern was the wife's
expenditure of time and labor enabling her husband to attend medical
school. This warranted compensation which the appellate court supported
through a reading of the applicable statute allowing for alimony "and other
such orders as the circumstances of the case may warrant relative to the
division of property, in such proportions as may be fair and equitable." Citing Colorado precedent establishing the definition of alimony as "payments
necessary for food, clothing, habitation, and other necessaries for the
[wife's] support," the appellate court distinguished Mrs. Greer's lump sum
"alimony" award as a property award adjustment. This was apparently
done to prevent the statutorily mandated termination of alimony payments
upon her remarriage, perhaps due to consideration given to the award's remunerative purpose in reimbursing her for contributions made towards her
husband's scholastic endeavors. Though not discussed in the court's find-
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of "partnership" theory by its intermingling of alimony and
property division concepts, 2 3 the amount of the award was at
24
best remuneration for the wife's contributions.
In Graham, the wife had not sought alimony.25 The Graham trial court, apparently aware of possible deprivation to the
wife's interests, concluded that she was entitled to a share of her
husband's future earning capacity 26 equal to the estimated per27

centage of her contributions.
The appellate court reversed, 28 finding no authority in sup29
port of the holding that education constitutes marital property.
On the contrary, it decided that education is only one factor to
be weighed in determining property division, alimony and child
support awards. 30 Focusing essentially upon problems of valuing education in terms of increased earning capacity,3 1 the ap-

ing, certain underlying circumstances may have been influential. Present in
the instant case was a minor son, custody of whom was awarded the wife,
with the potentially resulting threat to the wife's continued capacity to be
self-supporting. Such factors are familiar to typical determinations of
alimony per se.
23. See note 102 infra (discussing the need to clearly differentiate between alimony and property division).
24. 32 Colo. App. at 199, 510 P.2d at 907. The total award came to
$7,200.00.
25. 574 P.2d at 78. It appears unlikely that the wife could have demonstrated the requisite need for alimony where she was able to maintain employment and be self-supporting, despite a lack of accumulated funds.
Contra, Magruder v. Magruder, 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973). There
the wife was awarded over $100,000.00 in the form of alimony, although highly educated, childless, young and in good health. The term "alimony" appears to have been misused, the award being based upon her substantial
contributions to her husband's attainment of a medical degree. The court
found that the parties were on the verge of economic growth when the husband sought divorce. Even though the case arose in a "no-fault" jurisdiction, the majority opinion may have based its decision, as pointed out by the
strong dissent, upon fault, noting the wife's desire for reconciliation.
26. 574 P.2d at 76.
27. Brief for Petitioner-Appellee at 5, In re Marriage of Graham, 555 P.2d
527 (Colo. App. 1976). At trial, the wife called an expert who testified that
on the basis of probability of economic worth, the value of the advanced
degree over the undergraduate degree, in terms of lifetime expectancy, was
$178,000.00. This was discounted to present value of $82,800.00. He further
testified that a comparison of financial contributions by the spouses showed
that the wife and husband had contributed 70% and 30% respectively, credit
having been given to the husband's study time. These percentages were
decreased to 60% and 40% so as to present a more conservative figure. The
court awarded the wife a share of the "property" in the sum of $34,134.00.
See note 135 infra (comparison of valuation methods used).
28. 555 P.2d 527 (Colo. App. 1976).
29. Id. at 528.
30. Id. at 529.
31. Id. at 528 (citing Carlson v. Carlson, 178 Colo. 283, 286, 497 P.2d 1006,
1009-10 (1973) which stateck "No one questions that it is difficult to estimate
the prospects that the parties have to generate future earnings, but factors
such as occupational experience, coupled with education, training, and
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pellate court relied upon cases from other jurisdictions. Todd v.
Todd,32 which had arisen under California's community property law, found that while education was an intangible property
33
The Graham
right, it was unsuitable for monetary valuation.
the factual
upon
neither
elaborated
however,
appellate court,
34
offered
Also
circumstances of, nor sought to distinguish Todd.
v.
of
Stern
case
Jersey
in support of the reversal was the New
35
was
capacity
Stern similarly held that potential earning
Stern.
only one factor for trial court consideration in making an appropriate division of property.36 Again, any disparity in the facts
37
influential to that outcome were not discussed in Graham.
With her 'partnership investment" unrecognized, Anne Graham
filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Colorado Supreme
Court.
THE SUPREME COURT HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the appellate
court's reversal, 38 agreeing that an educational degree is not it39
In recognizing it as a
self marital property subject to division.
4
0 the court minimized
effort,
product of the husband's personal
business background should be considered in determining what division
should be made of property"). The appellate court did not discuss the impact of this finding upon a division of property wherein no assets were accumulated. It flatly stated that no authority existed to support a finding of
education as property itself.
32. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969). See text accompanying
notes 108-15 infra.
33. 272 Cal. App. 2d at 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 134. "If a spouse's education
...can be said to be 'community property'.. . it is manifestly of such a
character that a monetary value for division cannot be placed upon it."
34. See text accompanying notes 108-20 infra (comparison of factual circumstances in Graham).
35. 66 NJ. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975).
36. Id. at 345, 331 A.2d at 260. The court quoted the trial court's opinion,
123 N.J. Super. 566, 568, 304 A.2d 202, 204 (1973), stating that a husband's
ability, or earning capacity, was an amorphous asset of the marriage where
no others had been accumulated in that it consisted of his natural ability
and education.
37. The Stern divorce was based on fault, the wife being awarded custody of a minor child. Also, seemingly denying the presence of an interest
in her husband's earning capacity, the court awarded her a share in his established law practice. Also awarded were alimony and child support.
These facts appear radically different from those presented in In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978). See text accompanying notes 11520 infra.
38. 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978).
39. Id. at 77.
40. Id. The supreme court found an advanced degree to be a "product of
...years of previous education, diligence and hard work," in other words,
those contributions made by the husband alone.
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the wife's monetary contributions, 41 and thereby her "investment." The supreme court held that a degree is "personal to the
holder... and is simply an intellectual achievement that may
potentially assist in the future acquisition of property. In our
view it has none of the attributes of property in the usual sense
of that term."'42
ANALYSis

Division of Property.: A Concept in Flux
The National Conference of Commissioners, in developing a
uniform approach to the dissolution of marriage, 43 formulated
their original recommendation for division of property" as, in
essence, "a community property rule.'145 Sought to be incorporated in their Uniform Act was an effective alternative to the acknowledged deficiencies in the common law which gave little or
no consideration to property rights arising in the wife during,
and by virtue of, the marriage.4 6 Under the common law, the
husband was deemed to hold the property interests, leaving the
wife in a disadvantaged position4 7 Where the marriage was dissolved through no fault of the wife, she was awarded alimony in
lieu of a proprietary interest in marital assets.46 However, as
41. Id. An education "may not be acquired by the mere expenditure of
money."
42. Id.
43.

UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED

459 (Supp. 1977).
44. Id. at 490. § 307 defines "marital property" as:
[A]ll property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage
except,
(1) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(2) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(3) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
(4) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
(5) The increase or value of the property acquired prior to the marriage.
45.

FAMILY LAw REPORTER, DESK GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND

57 (1974). Generally, community property jurisdictions regard
property accumulated jointly during the marriage as that which is divisible
between its joint holders upon divorce. See text accompanying notes 52-56
DIVORCE ACT

infra.

46. E.g., Krauskopf, supra note 2, at 167-71.
47. See, e.g., Hill, Stogel, Family Law, 1976 ANN. SUtv. OF Am. LAw 359.
48. See CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.5, at 442, who argues that:
The husband, having entered one of the strongest, most permanent re-

lationships known to the law, must continue to bear its financial burden
where he can reasonably do so and where it is necessary to prevent a
relatively greater hardship to the wife. Divorce inevitably produces
painful alterations in the lives of the parties. A major function of ali-

mony is to minimize its financial impact.

716

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 12:709

more women joined their husbands in wage-earner roles, they
sought recognition of an equal right to title and disposition of
marital assets. Married Women's Property Acts formally equalized each spouse's ownership and management of respective
properties.4 9 But this ability to leave the marriage possessed of
individually earned property brought disadvantages as well.
The homemaker-housewife who owned little if any property
would be left empty-handed. Although this misfortune was
sought to be remedied by grants of alimony, 50 such remedy was
of dubious quality. The possible disproportion between an
award of alimony and the value of the property interests retained by the husband could render such a disposition less effective. 51 The common law was thus ripe for an alternative.
Community property laws provided for the wife's share in
marital assets.5 2 Property acquired by either spouse during the
marriage became property of the marital community,5 3 a development which fostered the view that marital property consists
of "products" of the marriage. 54 Weighing the economic status
of the divorcing spouses and the aforementioned shortcomings
undermining separate property concepts, 5 5 lawmakers perceived the marriage as a "shared undertaking, based on division
of labor, which should entitle each spouse to a share of the family assets. '5 6 Further, community property jurisdictions pro57
vided for such sharing of acquisitions without regard to fault.
This approach recognized economic realities regarding property
49. E.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 30 Colo. App. 57, 489 P.2d 1062 (1971)
(modern legal theory has equalized men's and women's rights to title and
disposition of property). See also Rheinstein, supra note 5, at 414.
50. E.g., Magarell v. Magarell, 144 Colo.228, 355 P.2d 946 (1960) (alimony
generally defined as that which is necessary for the wife's support). See
generally Inkler, Walsh, Perocchi, Alimony and Assignment of Property:
The New Statutory Scheme in Massachusetts, 11 FAm. L.Q. 59, 61 (1977)
[hereinafter referred to as Inkler] (alimony awards limited to amounts necessary for support; the separate property concept in combination with this
limitation restricted courts in rendering justice).
51. See generally Krauskopf, supra note 2, at 168.
52. Id. at 167 n.19 (citing W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF
CommuNrry PROPERTY 128 (1971) [hereinafter cited as DE FUNIAK &
VAUGHN]):

Property acquired during the marriage is community property because:
"[I] t is acquired by the labor and industry of members of a form of partnership, that is, a marital partnership ... and whatever is earned or

gained by one marital partner during the existence of [the marriage]

must accrue to the benefit of both marital partners."
53. E.g., DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 52, at 128.
54. Staff, Property,Maintenance and Child Support: Decrees Under the
Uniform Marriageand Divorce Act, 18 S.D. L. REv. 559, 566-67 (1973).

55. See text accompanying notes 47-51 supra.
56. Inkler, supra note 50, at 61.

57. E.g., Rheinstein, supra note 5, at 416.
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division upon divorce. Hence, it tended to conceptualize dissolution as analogous to dissolving a partnership.5 8 Relief from
the harsh common law was therefore available, and the Commissioners agreed with suggestions that their uniform proposal
59
be aligned with these current social demands.
Marital Property:Narrowing the Expanse

"Property" necessarily encompasses a multitude of characteristics. 60 Traditionally, it has generally been defined as a manifestation of human expectations arising from the relationship of
the possessor to the thing possessed.6 1 This relation has been
subject to both legislative and judicial interpretation in varying
contexts. 62 Indeed it has been said that the context controls the
63
definition.
The Colorado property division statute is clearly limited to
"marital property."'' The limitations imposed do not expressly
erode the statute's applicability to property in general. As recognized by the supreme court in Graham, the legislature's intent was to give broad meaning to the term65 while excluding
58. E.g.,

DE FuNAK & VAUGHN,

supra note 52, at 128. See Freed, Foster,

Economic Effects of Divorce, 7 FAM. L.Q. 275, 277 (1973).
59. See Krauskopf, supra note 2, at 167 n.14 (citing R. LEVY, UNIFORM
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY ANALYsis 165 (1968)).
60. E.g., BALLANTNE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1009-10 (3rd ed. 1969) defines
"property" as:
Inclusive of both tangibles and intangibles; that which is corporeal and
that which is incorporeal; ... Strictly, that dominion or indefinite right
of use, control and disposition which may be lawfully exercised over
particular things or objects .... The right of a person to possess, use,
enjoy and dispose of a thing .... Not the material object itself, but the
right and interest or disposition rightfully obtained over such object.
[A] 1 valuable interests which a man may possess outside of
himself ... being more than which a person owns.
61. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION, PRINCIPLES OF THE

Crvn

CODE

111-13, Part 1 (Dumont ed. 1864):
Property is nothing but a basis of expectation; the expectation of deriving certain advantages from a thing which we are said to possess, in
consequence of the relation in which we stand towards it .... There is
no . . .visible trait which can express the relation that constitutes a
property. It is not material, it is metaphysical; it is a mere conception of
the mind.
62. See generally 63 Am. JuR. 2d Property §§ 5-6 (1972).
63. See Comment, The Interest of the Community in a ProfessionalEducation, 10 CALIF. W.L. REV. 590, 598 (1974).
64. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(1) (1973): "[Tlhe court shall set apart
to each spouse his property and shall divide the marital property...."
65. 574 P.2d at 76. The supreme court cited Las Animas County High
School District v. Raye, 144 Colo. 367, 356 P.2d 237 (1960) (the term property
encompasses that which belongs to a person and the right to which is legally protected).

718

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 12:709

property acquired during certain times and through particular
67
modes. 66 That marital property be "subject to division, ' however, invoked the court's power to "at all times interpret Colo68
rado statutes."
Notwithstanding these legislative guidelines, the supreme
'6 9
Lackcourt restrictively defined the term "marital property.
ing, it said, was any indication of legislative intent to include facets of the term "other than those usually understood to be [so]
-70 Varied attributes gleaned from prior deciembodied ....
71
partial
definitions 72 were used to support this cateand
sions,
gorization. These signpost characteristics further delimited the
legislature's broad conception of property appropriate to division of marital acquisitions. 73 Such supplementary limits fore74
closed reinstatement of the trial court's finding.
Colorado trial judges have long been vested with vast discretion in effectuating just divisions of marital property. 75 The
facts and circumstances of each case, upon which this discretion
is exercised, have proven determinative. 76 Other indicia, how66. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(2) (1973) defines "marital property" as:
[A] 11 property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage
except:
a) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
b) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to
the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
c) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation; and
d) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties.
67. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(1) (1973).
68. 574 P.2d at 76.
69. See note 65 supra and notes 71-72 infra.
70. 574 P.2d at 77.
71. E.g., Ellis v. Ellis, 552 P.2d 506 (Colo. 1976) (elements characterizing
marital property include cash surrender value, loan value, redemption
value, lump-sum value and value realizable after death).
72. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1382 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) was cited for its
mention that "property" encompasses "everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate."
73. See note 71 supra.
74. Although the appellate court did not expressly so find, it has been
consistently held that a trial court's determination should not be disturbed
on review unless abuse of discretion is shown. E.g., Carlson v. Carlson, 178
Colo. 283, 497 P.2d 1006 (1972); Bell v. Bell, 156 Colo. 513, 400 P.2d 440 (1965);
Granato v. Granato, 130 Colo. 439, 277 P.2d 236 (1954).
75. Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102, 1113-15 &n.11 (D. Colo. 1974).
See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-5 (1963).
76. E.g., Carlson v. Carlson, 178 Colo. 283, 497 P.2d 1006 (1972) (no rigid
mathematical formula for establishing an equitable division of property);
Kraus v. Kraus, 159 Colo. 331,411 P.2d 240 (1966); Reap v. Reap, 142 Colo.-354,
350 P.2d 1063 (1960). See Rheinstein, supra note 5, at 432:
Judicial discretion ... may appear.., indispensable. No hard ...
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ever, have also been established in aid of such discretion, such
as, the efforts and attitudes of the spouses toward the particular
77
acquisitions, earning ability, necessity, and financial condition.
Additionally, the "partnership-shared enterprise" approach was
7 8
originally intended to further a just division.
Despite this support of broad trial court discretion, the
supreme court failed to incorporate any acknowledgement of
separate "partnership" interests. Thus, the wife's interest in
"investment" returns as a result of her contributions 79 was left
unrecognized even though such security was generally intended
where jointly accrued property would otherwise inure to the
benefit of only one marital partner. 80 While the court may have
been aware of such underpinnings, its reasoning reflects no influence by them. The court expressed the conception that an
education must first be determined as property before any value
can be assigned.8 1 The broader question of whether prospective
benefits attained through utilization of the degree after dissolution was not discussed. 82 Anticipated obstacles to valuation apparently stirred the court to seek shelter in judge-made
limitations, 8 3 but to the contravention of "shared-enterprise"
principles. With this consequence in the offing, to what rationale could this apprehension be attributed?
Education:A Cooperative vs. A Personal "Harvest"
The supreme court in Graham, relying upon cases cited in
the appellate opinion, 84 neglected to discuss or distinguish posrule seems to do justice to infinitely varying circumstances of individual
cases ....
But, as in all problems of public policy, one has to consider the
price, and the price of individual justice can be high. One can never entirelyforesee how judicialdiscretion will be exercised, andforeseeability may be vital to a marriedperson who must decide whether or not to
take the grave step of divorce. (emphasis added).
77. Other indicia to aid discretion in division of property include: How
the property was acquired; the parties' financial situation; their contributions to preserving its value; the value of their respective properties; the
duration of the marriage; earning capacity; age; and health. E.g., Kraus v.
Kraus, 159 Colo. 31, 411 P.2d 240 (1966); Liggett v. Liggett, 152 Colo. 110, 380
P.2d 673 (1963); Nunemacher v. Nunemacher, 132 Colo. 300, 287 P.2d 662
(1955); Larrabee v. Larrabee, 31 Colo. App. 493, 504 P.2d 358 (1972).
78. See Krauskopf, supra note 2, at 166.
79. See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
80. E.g., DE Ftu.AK & VAUGHN, supra note 52, at 128.
81. 574 P.2d at 77.
82. Cf.In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978) (potential increased earning capacity is a marital asset subject to division).
83. See note 71 supra & note 131 infra.
84. Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969); Stern v.
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sible factual dissimilarities. 85 The court also failed to explain
any differences in cases cited as dealing "only with related issues." 86 Closer scrutiny of these decisions reveals distinctions
which may have had a greater impact upon the supreme court's
reasoning than that indicated.
In Danielsv. Daniels,8 7 the wife's lump-sum alimony award
was "based almost entirely upon the [husband's] future earning
capacity in the medical profession." 88 This professional opportunity constituted the marriage's principal asset. It arose
through the use of the husband's medical education, acquired
through the couple's collective efforts. While the wife contributed a tangible asset in the form of money, the husband's contributions were intangible in the form of intellect and ambition.8 9
The medical practice, according to the appellate court, was in
the nature of a franchise and therefore subject to a trial court's
consideration in determining alimony. The problem of valuing
such an asset for property division was thereby obviated by the
readily used factor of increased earning capacity in the computation of financial support. 9° Whether the potential for increased earning capacity could stand as property itself9' or as a
method of valuing an education 92 was not at issue.
In cases dealing with certain intangibles, 93 the inherently
94
personal nature of the possession impedes judicial division.
Freedom of choice in utilizing a particular achievement, ability
Stem, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975). But see CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.5, at

443: "[P]recedents are of relatively little value in determining alimony."
This statement is based on discussion of numerous factors influential to
trial court discretion in making such an award. See generally Rheinstein,
supra note 5, at 432. It might be contended that precedent is similarly weak

in the area of property division.

85. See note 37 supra and text accompanying notes 108-20 infra.

86. 574 P.2d at 77.
87. 20 Ohio Op. 2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773 (1961).
88. Id. at 459, 185 N.E.2d at 774.
89. Id.

90. E.g., Carlson v. Carlson, 178 Colo. 283, 497 P.2d 1006 (1972); CLARK,
supra note 1, § 14.5, at 443 (alimony award takes into account the husband's
ability to pay which necessarily entails inquiry into earning capacity).
91. Cf text accompanying notes 128-36 infra (potential for increased
earnings deemed a marital asset to be valued and divided).
92. 574 P.2d 75.
93. E.g., Ellis v. Ellis, 552 P.2d 506 (Colo. 1976) (wife's interest in husband's military retirement pay); Menor v. Menor, 154 Colo. 475, 391 P.2d 473
(1964) (insurance policy not marital property subject to division where it
had no cash surrender value); Kalcevic v. Kalcevic, 156 Colo. 151, 397 P.2d
483 (1964) (value of stock). See, e.g,, Shaw, Domestic Relations--Husband's
"Vested" Interest in Retirement Planis Divisible as MaritalProperty,42 Mo.
L. REv. 143 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Shaw]; Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 1421

(1952) (pension of husband as resource).
94. See Shaw, supra note 93, at 149.
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or skill 95 is a primary obstacle to this end. Where, however, a
dependent or incapacitated spouse proves the need for continued support upon divorce, such personal freedom must give
way. Such a showing of dependence lessens the court's apprehension of impinging upon freedom of choice, putting to work
the supporting spouse's skill or recognized ability. 96 Future
earning capacity often enables an appropriate calculation of alimony, 97 hence, the supporting spouse's duty of support is met.98
The clearly debilitated position of the recipient warrants such
financial assistance. As a safeguard, modification of the award is
available should extenuating circumstances arise, 99 a feature
unavailable to the division of property. 00
95. E.g., Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262 N.W.2d 487, 493 (N.D. 1978):
[TJhe potential future earnings, be they the result of a skill developed
during marriage or otherwise, are much too tenuous to be a property

right. It would be unjust to order the distribution of what is, at best, an

expectancy, where... [it may] fail to materialize. When the nature of
the interest is such that the court must maintain its jurisdiction, distribution must take the form of alimony .... (emphasis added).
96. See CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.5, at 443:
Alimony need not be limited by the husband's income as of the time of
trial. If he is not earning as much as he might, either deliberately or
through poor management, alimony may be calculated on the basis of
what the court thinks he could and should earn. Likewise, his future
prospects for increased earnings may be considered.... Caution
should be exercised in estimating his future earnings, however, since
hardship to the husband may result from an over-estimate. (emphasis
added).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 442. But see Project, Rehabilitative Spousal Support: In Need
of a More Comprehensive Approach to Mitigating Dissolution Trauma, 12
U. OF S.F. L. REV.493 (1978). A developing trend is to determine the amount
and object of financial support. An award of "rehabilitative" alimony, for
example, might be appropriate where one spouse had foregone further education in enabling the other's academic pursuit. Financial assistance, provided for a limited time, could thereby combine with efforts of the oncesupporting spouse towards similar educational ends, yielding an opportunity similar to that afforded the other. Apparently, no direct compensation
for time lost could be awarded. Such a time factor would be given considerably greater weight, however, where the marriage was of such a lengthy
duration that the "deprived" spouse would more appropriately be awarded
alimony in its more traditional application.
99. E.g., Zlaten v. Zlaten, 117 Colo. 296, 186 P.2d 583 (1947). See generally 24 Am.Jun. 2d PermanentAlimony § 665 (1966). See also CLARK, supra

note 1, § 14.8, at 452-65 (modification of alimony).
100. E.g., Triebelhorn v. Turzanski, 149 Colo. 558, 370 P.2d 757 (1962)
(court lost jurisdiction to divide property where it had not divided property
at the time of the decree); Shapiro v. Shapiro, 115 Colo. 505, 176 P.2d 363
(1946) (division of property based on circumstances existing at time of divorce). See 24 Am.JuR. 2d Modificationof Decree § 941, at 1075 (1966):
If... a decree provides for a lump sum or payments in installments
...it is generally held that the award is final and is not subject to modification as the circumstancesof the partieschange, and this is true even

though a decree in favor of the wife erroneously calls the award "ali-
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In contrast, where the need for alimony is less than "substantial," the factor of freedom of choice whether to use a skill or
10 1
In such cases, there
degree will attract greater consideration.
is firmer adherence to the traditional rationale supporting the
appropriateness of alimony and/or division of property
03
cited by the Graham maawards. 10 2 The case of Nail v. Nail,
04
jority,1 is indicative of this point. There, the accrued good will
of an established medical practice was held not "an earned or
[T]hat it
vested right or one which fixes any benefit or sum ....
expectancy
an
than
more
is
no
future
the
in
value
would have
wholly dependent upon continuation of existing circumstances."'1 5 Based upon this contingency of continued practice,
dependent as it is upon personal skill, experience and reputation, the Texas Supreme Court held improper any characteriza10 6
tion of good will as community property subject to division.
Noteworthy, however, was the wife's community interest in a
However, the court may construe and clarify in case of
mony" .....
uncertainty .... (emphasis added).
See also CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.8, at 452 (modification of both alimony
and property division awards would be preferable).
101. E.g., 262 N.W.2d 487 (N.D. 1978).
102. E.g., In re Questions Submitted by United States District Court, 517
P.2d 1331, 1335 (Colo. 1974). "A court may conclude that a wife has sufficient
property and income not to be entitled to alimony. That does not mean that
division of property is a part of alimony ..... " See generally CLARK, supra
note 1, § 14.8, at 450-52, stating:
[T] he fundamental difference between the two ... is in the purpose for
which they are given and the function which they serve. The [function]
of alimony [relates] primarily to support of the wife .... Many courts
...assimilate the property division to the alimony decree, taking into
account the same sort of factors which are relevant in settling alimony .... The authority to make the division is ... granted in general
It is
terms, limited only [in that] . . .the result be "equitable" .....
easy to see how ... the courts have come to blur the distinction....
The ensuing confusion would not matter if it were not for the legal consequences regarding the inability to modify property divisions.;
Rheinstein, supra note 5, at 418: 'The frequent insufficiency of the right to
alimony, together with the postulated equality of husband and wife, is resulting in an increased demand for property sharing upon divorce ....
These ideals ... contradict each other and the problem of how to reconcile
them is troublesome." See notes 99-100 supra.
103. 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972).
104. 574 P.2d at 77.
105. Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. 1972) (emphasis added). Accord, In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974)
(future earnings not synonymous with value of good will). Contra,
Brawman v. Brawman, 199 Cal. App. 2d 876, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1962) (established law practice evaluated to determine wife's interest therein).
106. The general rule is that good will is not subject to forced sale or
fictional division where affixed to principal property. See 38 C.J.S. Good
Will §§ 3-4 (1943). See also Lurvey, ProfessionalGoodwill on Marital Dissolution:"Is It Property or Another Name for Alimony?, 52 CAL. S. B.J. 27
(1977).
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large accumulation of assets which10 7would apparently soothe
shattered hopes of marital security.
Todd v. Todd, 10 8 also relied upon by the supreme court in
Graham,10 9 presented distinguishable facts as well. There, the
mother of minor children had shown her incapacity to seek independent employment after divorce." 0 The California Court of
Appeals found that "while the [husband's] right to practice law
is a property right which cannot be classed as community property, the value of the practice at the time of dissolution . . .is
community property.""' While a monetary value could not be
placed upon the degree, 112 existing resultant gains from the established practice provided a basis for the wife's property interests. 113 In this manner, though the wife's "investment" returns
were not satisfied, she was given a share in the degree's benefits
California case," 4 a silent
as though she were, as said in another
5
partner forced into retirement."
The facts in Graham stymied application of the "shared enterprise" approach. No pre-exisitng practice was available upon
which to build a case for valuation. 116 The education, although a
culmination of combined efforts, was found to have no readily
ascertainable value, and no benefits had been produced through
its use." 7 There was little likelihood that the wife could prove a
need for support sufficient to even hint at an alimony award." 8
107. 486 S.W.2d at 762. Among the accumulated assets were a house, real
property, household fixtures, two automobiles and a boat.
108. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969).
109. 574 P.2d at 77.
110. 272 Cal.App. 2d at 795, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
111. 272 Cal. App. 2d at 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (emphasis added).
112. Id.
113. 272 Cal. App. 2d at 792, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 136. The appellate court reasoned that the trial court must take these existing benefits into consideration and therefore remanded the case.
114. Brawman v. Brawman, 199 Cal. App. 2d 876, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1962).
115. Id. The husband's established practice was proven in terms of past
success. The court felt that this valuable practice would depart with the

husband upon divorce. It equated the wife's position with that of a silent
partner with a share due her upon divorce. Accord, Fritsche v. Teed, 213
Cal. App. 2d 718, 726, 29 Cal. Rptr. 114, 119 (1963). The husband had an established professional practice. The court found that, upon divorce, "the

...professional practice.., remains in the hands of the spouse licensed to
practice it. Nevertheless, in terms of its existing economic potential, it may
have a substantial worth which must be taken into account ...."
116. Contra,Wheeler v. Wheeler, 193 Neb. 615, 228 N.W.2d 594 (1975) (veterinarian husband, who acquired his degree with the wife's aid through
financial contributions, had established practice). See generally cases cited
in notes 114-15 supra.
117. 574 P.2d 75.

118. Id. The wife had been and was currently employed; no children
were present; she was young and in good health. Contra, Colvert v. Colvert,
568 P.3d 623 (Okla. 1977), where the Oklahoma Supreme Court found statu-
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The lack of such a showing may have tipped the balance against
what otherwise appeared as a strong argument favoring an interest in the degree. 1 9 She sought fulfillment of her investment
expectations, a lonely request in the light of considerations

favoring her husband's choice regarding any prospective use of
his degree.
Apprehensive of potential injustice, the supreme court
briefly reflected that a spouse who contributes support while the
120
In a
other acquires an education is not without a remedy.
court's
comprehensive comment submitted for the supreme
consideration and addressing the problem of valuing a profes121
one writer
sional degree for division of property purposes,
elaborately set forth theories of recovery both in equity and at
law. 122 Offering generally compensatory relief, however, these
alternatives do not equitably redress the sacrifices made by the
"investing" partner. Thus, the Graham supreme court did not
acknowledge that, without an enforceable interest in the value
of the education, the non-student spouse is deprived of the benefits for which "only the law of community property offers protection."' 123 Without discussion of these inadequacies, the court
tory support for a property settlement award characterized as "alimony"
despite its non-supportive function. The court thus compensated the wife's
investment in her husband's professional career, although avoiding the perceived mire of questions surrounding property rights in education and resultant increased earning capacity.
119. Cf.In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978) (the
income of the wife in custody of the child, combined with the child support
award, reached only a modest level of subsistence).
120. 574 P.2d at 78. The court indicated that consideration of the education would be appropriate for division of accumulated assets or in calculating alimony.
121. See Comment, The Interest of the Community in a ProfessionalEducation, 10 CAUF. W.L. REV. 590 (1974).
122. Id. at 592-97. In equity, quantum meruit is generally available to a
putative spouse, but no reason supports the idea that services rendered in a
valid marriage are less deserving of recovery. Such relief would not, however, reflect the benefits derived from the education, therefore unjustly enriching the "student" spouse. Second, implied loan theory would provide
only for recapture of expenditures made by the "non-student" spouse,
thereby leaving the student enriched once again. Thirdly, community property jurisdictions could apply an unjust enrichment concept to the managing spouse's fiduciary duty to care for the marital assets in his charge. This
concept would seem inapplicable in other jurisdictions. At law, support (alimony/maintenance) is available though dependent upon the recipient's
demonstrated needs. Secondly, reimbursement, similar to the use of community property funds to improve one spouse's separate property, is obstructed by consent to use the funds towards an education.
This delineation of alternatives was appended to the wife's petition.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, Appendix C, In re Marriage of Graham, 574
P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978).
123. Comment, The Interest of the Community in a ProfessionalEducation, 10 CALiF. W.L. REV. 590, 591 (1974). It is conceivable that the supreme
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instead reasoned that education could be given weight as a factor, but not as property itself, in the division of accrued marital
property 124 However, as in Graham, if the education and its resultant potential for increased earnings are excluded, no accumulated marital assets remain.
THE KINDRED CASES: SEEDS OF DIsCONTENT?
Recent cases have considered the argument set forth by the

Graham dissent: That increased potential earning capacity con125
stitutes the asset to be divided between the marital partners.
Once again, factual circumstances intertwined with trial court
discretion appear to have controlled these judicial attempts to
achieve a delicate balance of equitable concerns. 126 In response
to an initial inquiry into the factual setting of each case, these
courts have curiously given problems of valuation only second27
ary consideration.
129
In re Marriageof Horstmann128 agreed with Todd v. Todd
130
Also cognizant
that a degree is not, of itself, a "marital" asset.
of the cases cited and the limited interpretation given to the
term "marital property" in Graham,'3 ' the Iowa Supreme Court
approached the problem more expansively. The Horstmann
trial court expressly adopted a "partnership" theory, finding
that, had the marriage held together, the wife would have real-

court in Graham consciously chose not to follow community property
precepts. See In re Marriage of Ellis, 36 Colo. App. 234, 237, 538 P.2d 1347,
1349 (1975). The appellate court declared that Colorado is not a community
property state and such laws do not control. From the context in which this
statement was made, however, it may have referred to the oftentimes equal
division required of marital property in those jurisdictions, and hence not
literally preclusive of the considerations underlying the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act.
124. 574 P.2d at 77-78.
125. In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 78 (Colo. 1978) (Carrigan, J.,
dissenting).
126. See text accompanying notes 96-100 supra.
127. See note 95 supra.
128. 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978). See, e.g., Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262
N.W.2d 487, 493-94 (N.D. 1978) (Vogel, J., dissenting). "[T]he earning ability
•..
is an asset of the marriage and should be considered in making [a]
property division."
129. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969).
130. 263 N.W.2d at 891. Accord, In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75
(Colo. 1978). The supreme court in Horstmann stated: "[W1e have no quarrel with the pronouncement of the majority in Graham which would mean
that the law degree [does not of itself] constitute an asset of the parties

131. 263 N.W.2d at 887. The court recognized the limitations to the characterization of a degree as marital property, in that it has no exchange value
nor transferable value; further, it terminates on death and cannot be assigned, sold, conveyed or pledged.
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ized the benefits of her sacrifices in terms of increased family
income and improved life style. The potential for increased
earnings was determined as the only distributable marital asset. 3 2 The trial judge took this insightful step based upon the
common use of future earning capacity, affected by personal
33
skills and education, in computing alimony awards.
The supreme court, in a de novo review, affirmed. 34 Absent
from the opinion, however, was an explanation of the method
used in valuing the potential earning capacity. 135 Nonetheless,
the curious award of one dollar per year alimony affords an inference that a larger support award may have been inappropriate in view of those facts bespeaking the wife's minimal need for
assistance. 136 Upon a less-than-substantial showing of need, division of property could supplant alimony, while the nominal alimony award could hold the door open for modification should a
greaterneed for support arise.
In Moss v. Moss, 1 3 7 the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower court's "alimony" award granted to a self-supporting
wife. 138 The husband argued against the award's seeming incompatibility with the traditional rationale for financial support. 139 The appellate court was aware, however, of the
unavailability of assets for division, at least partially due to the
132. Id. "[T]he obtaining [of a degree] through efforts of both parties is
similar to the building of a business through joint efforts... ." But see Wilcox v. Wilcox, 365 N.W.2d 792 (Ind. App. 1977); Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262
N.W.2d 487, 493 (N.D. 1978).
133. 263 N.W.2d at 888. As noted by the supreme court, the trial judge
found little difficulty in dealing with the problem of future expectancy regarding success in future endeavors. "IT]here is no guarantee that [the
husband would gain] a good paying job ... or that his practice ... will be a
financial success."
134. 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978).
135. Id. at 886. The trial court had used the wife's testimony regarding
finances contributed. The supreme court, however, did not elaborate upon
its own suggestions that various methods are available for valuing such an
asset. The wife in Grahampresented a much more elaborate case for valuation though the amount calculated there was much greater than in Horstmann. This may have been influential to these disparate findings. See note
27 supra.
136. 263 N.W.2d at 890. The supreme court viewed the wife's position as
tenuous, given her custody of the couple's minor child, a lack of accumulated assets, and her limited earning capacity. It attributed her modest subsistence to her having foregone education to support her husband and care
for the child.
137. 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978).
138. Id. at 694-95, 264 N.W.2d at 98. Although the wife's income would
exceed the husband's for the first few years following divorce, alimony in
gross was awarded as an equitable adjustment of property interests. Accord, Magruder v. Magruder, 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973) (young,
employed and educated wife awarded "alimony").
139. See Inkler, supra note 50, at 69. See note 48 supra.
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wife's contributions toward her husband's attainment of a medical degree. The court realized that granting the wife a share in
the degree itself was impossible, 14° and that she would be "left
by the roadside before the fruits of that education could be har41
vested."1
There also, the wife had virtually no need for alimony per
1 42
Although she similarly contended that she was entitled to
se.
a sum proportionate to investment expectations, as in Graham,
143
the court's award was only remunerative of her expenditures.
Nevertheless, the compensatory grant of "alimony," in lieu of a
property settlement, avoided the gross inequity resulting from
no award whatsoever.'" Further, it is interesting to note that,
on appeal, the manner of payment was modified in response to
the husband's complaint that a lump-sum grant was burdensome to him while still pursuing his medical training! 145 In so
doing, the Moss court minimized intrusion into his personal endeavor, a compromise not ordinarily available to the division of
property, though enabled through the use of "alimony" in other
than its traditional context. 14
140. 80 Mich. App. at 695, 264 N.W.2d at 98. Accord, In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr.
131 (1969).
141. 80 Mich. App. at 694, 264 N.W.2d at 98.
142. Id. The couple had been married for seven years and were without

children; the wife remained employed and there was no indication that she

suffered from ill health or incapacity.
143. Id. The court awarded $15,000.00 which it felt was sufficient to compensate her for her contributions to the "asset."
144. The Moss court thereby achieved resolution in one proceeding, an
economical result for the court and the parties. This result was propounded
by the Graham dissent, 574 P.2d 75, 79 (Carrigan, J., dissenting). Further,
the Grahammajority did not consider the potential for applying concepts of
"rehabilitative" alimony. In Morgan v. Morgan, 81 Misc. 2d 616, 366 N.Y.S.2d
977 (1975), the appellate court awarded a wife financial support that would
enable her pursuit of a medical degree, previously foregone in financing her

husband's education. The court, despite her actual employment, felt that
she should not be relegated to work as a "technician" where she might

otherwise have attained a professional career. Such an award, though far

from recompensing an "investment" interest, would closely approximate

the opportunities afforded the husband. Following reasoning apparently
akin to Morgan, the court in Marvin v. Marvin, No. C-23303 (Sup. Ct. L.A.
April 18, 1979), granted an unmarried woman over $100,000.00 for "rehabilitative" purposes where her expectations of security in a non-marital relationship were disappointed. See note 98 supra.
145. See note 100 supra.
146. See, e.g., Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1974). There, the
wife of a long-standing marriage, who had once contributed to her husband's medical education, was awarded alimony in lieu of property interests. The court realized that the award was a misnomer, though it affirmed
the trial court's findings. The husband's contention that the award was
based upon a share in his medical practice was rejected. The court considered the husband's increased earning capacity in view of the wife's having
nothing to show for the marriage if the award was denied; Magruder v. Ma-
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Most recertly, the Kentucky Court of Appeals was confronted with Inman v. Inman,147 a case virtually identical to Graham. The court was realistically apprehensive of opening a
Pandora's box of obstacles to equitable resolution of property
division by categorizing a professional license to practice dentistry as "marital property."'148 It did, however, acknowledge
that the circumstances of the parties, considering such factors
as duration of the marriage, accumulation of marital assets, and
sacrifices made by an "investing" spouse to her detriment, could
guide the court in flexibly defining whether such an achieve1 49
ment could be, for that particular case, "marital property.'
Despite such an admirable perspective, the court declined to define her interest with the same breadth. Expenses paid for
schooling and familial support, with allowances for interest and
inflation would generally comprise the award befitting the supporting spouse. 150 Yet such an award is merely remunerative,
once again indicating the courts' refusals to expand "partnership" theory.
CONCLUSION

Satisfying a contributing spouse's investment expectations
while appeasing the court's equitable conscience is a delicate
balance. Division of the intangible right embodied in an educational degree is hampered by its uniquely personal elements.
The court is faced with weighing conflicting social interests: On
the one hand, failure to acknowledge the "investor's" interests
in increased marital security intrudes upon "partnership" principles which evolved in response to changing social attitudes toward spousal roles; on the other, impingement upon personal
gruder, 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973); Greer v. Greer, 32 Colo.App. 196,
510 P.2d 905 (1973). See also note 102 supra.
147. 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. App. 1979).
148. Id. at 268.
This court has strong reservations about placing a professional license
in the category of marital property. Doing so can only create another
field for battle in the already complex and delicate area of division of
marital property. In spite of these reservations, however, we feel that
there are certain instances in which [doing so] ... is the only way a
court can achieve an equitable result. (emphasis added).

149. Id. The court meant these guidelines to serve only as examples of
avenues open to a trial court's reasoning. The court felt compelled to offer
these due to recognition that to "refuse to find any sort of protected property interest would work the grossest inequity ....
In those instances
[where] . . .little or no maritalproperty has been accumulated,. . . there
is generally no entitlement to maintenance as each spouse is self-supporting." (emphasis added). Thus, the court found justification for the "investment" argument without the presence of influential factors typical to an
alimony award.
150. Id.
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freedom to utilize such a skill or professional ability speaks
strongly to the exclusion of such an intangible property from division upon divorce. Courts must nevertheless attempt to resolve this dilemma. Current decisions regretfully lack the
explicitness necessary to clearly guide the divorcing partners
and their attorneys through their disentanglement.
A separate scrutiny of individual cases reflects the presence
of factual circumstances which have influenced courts to cross
the borders of property division to draw from elements traditionally related to awards of alimony. Typically in this area, a
spouse proving a substantial need for support is generally
granted both alimony and property division. But when that requisite need is marginal, alimony is not usually justified. However, when potential incapacitation is combined with an
absence of accumulated assets and disparity in the partners' future financial security, the threat of gross inequity becomes apparent. With alimony unavailable and no property to divide, the
potentially needy spouse is left unprotected.
Where such
threatened deprivation is evidenced, the only accessible item
from which to seek relief may be the collectively-attained,
though singularly-possessed, education. That it was acquired
through collaborative effort yields a "partnership interest." The
contributing spouse's dependence places the problem of valuation in a position of secondary importance, if that.
Conversely, where not even a threatened need for financial
support is shown amongst the myriad facts within the court's
purview, the inherent problems of valuing an education take
precedence. Courts are unwilling to burden the personal, intangible right to use and reap the benefits from an educational degree, where no justification for imposing a continuing duty
exists. This is so despite the "partnership" entity, lending the
inference that judicial utilization of this "shared enterprise"
concept may be treading close to its periphery. In such a case,
remedies yielding remuneration for amounts contributed appear appropriate, though leaving expended time and the hope of
marital security uncompensated.
The trend to perceive marriage as a joint endeavor is clear
though the scope of this concept is obscured by the clash between certainty in division of property and the expectations of
the marital partners. Both certainty and expectancy are sought
in human endeavor and are especially magnified within the marital relationship. If this is true, exacting legal propositions developed in attempts to meet reality's demands will inevitably
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fall short of predictability, thus leaving inequities to be borne
not by the courts, but by the partners themselves.
Jon R. Flynn

